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Abstract
We study a version of the classical zero-sum matrix game with unknown payoff
matrix and bandit feedback, where the players only observe each others actions
and a noisy payoff. This generalizes the usual matrix game, where the payoff
matrix is known to the players. Despite numerous applications, this problem has
received relatively little attention. Although adversarial bandit algorithms achieve
low regret, they do not exploit the matrix structure and perform poorly relative
to the new algorithms. The main contributions are regret analyses of variants of
UCB and K-learning that hold for any opponent, e.g., even when the opponent
adversarially plays the best response to the learner’s mixed strategy. Along the
way, we show that Thompson fails catastrophically in this setting and provide
empirical comparison to existing algorithms.
1 Two-player zero-sum games
Any two-player zero-sum game can be described by a payoff matrixA ∈ Rm×k [41]. The row player
selects i ∈ {1..m} and column player selects j ∈ {1..k}. These choices are revealed simultaneously
and the row player makes a payment ofAij to the column player. In general, the optimal strategy for
each player is mixed, i.e. determined by a probability distribution across actions. We can therefore
determine the optimal strategy for each player to maximize their reward:
(row) argminy∈∆m maxi(A
T y)i (1)
(column) argmaxx∈∆k minj(Ax)j , (2)
where ∆p is the probability simplex of dimension p− 1.
The linear programs (LPs) (1) and (2) are dual, and strong duality for LPs means that the optimal
values for each problem are identical [40, 9]. We refer to this shared optimal quantity as the value
of the game, denoted V ?A .
V ?A := min
y∈∆m
max
x∈∆k
yTAx = max
x∈∆k
min
y∈∆m
yTAx. (3)
Any primal-dual strategies (x?, y?) satisfying (3) are a Nash equilibrium [25], though they may not
be unique. Playing a Nash equilibrium x? is minimax optimal, you cannot improve on it for all
opponent strategies y. Equation (3) also yields the surprising result that there is no advantage to
knowing your opponent’s strategy in advance if their strategy is optimal.
1.1 Learning in repeated stochastic games
Matrix games have a myriad of real-world applications, including economics, diplomacy, finance,
optimization, auctions, and voting systems. This paper extends the analysis to the case where the
players are also uncertain of the payoff matrix A, but can learn through their experience. In each
round t ∈ N the row player chooses it ∈ {1..m} and the column player chooses jt ∈ {1..k}. The
payment from row player to column player is given by,
rt = Aitjt + ηt (4)
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where ηt is zero-mean noise, independent and identically distributed from a known distribution
across time. We define Ft = (i1, j1, r1, . . . , it−1, jt−1, rt−1) to be the sequence of observations
available to each player prior to round t, and as shorthand we shall use the notation Et(·) = E( · |
Ft). Two aspects of this problem distinguish it from other setups considered in the literature [14, 8,
33]. Firstly, the players receive the actions of their opponents as observations and secondly the fact
that the players receive noisy bandit feedback of the payoff.
We will perform our analysis from the perspective of a single player, who does not control the
actions of the opponent. Without loss of generality, we assume control of the column player and
define a learning algorithm alg as a measurable mapping from histories Ft to a distribution over
actions x ∈ ∆k. In order to assess the quality of an algorithm alg we consider the regret, or shortfall
in cumulative rewards, relative to the optimal value,
R(A, alg, T ) = Eη,alg
[
T∑
t=1
V ?A − rt
]
. (5)
This quantity (5) depends on the unknown matrix A, which is fixed at the start of play and kept the
same throughout. Expectations are taken with respect to the noise added in the payoffs η and the
learning algorithm alg. To assess the quality of learning algorithms designed to work across some
family of games A ∈ A we define:
BayesRegret(φ, alg, T ) = EA∼φR(A, alg, T ), (6)
WorstCaseRegret(A, alg, T ) = max
A∈A
R(A, alg, T ). (7)
The two objectives are sometimes called Bayesian (average-case) (6) and frequentist (worst-case)
(7). Here, φ is a prior probability measure over A ∈ A that assigns relative importance to each
problem instance.
1.2 Main results
The main contribution of this paper is to show that agents employing the ‘optimism in the face of
uncertainty’ (OFU) principle enjoy strong bounds O˜(
√
mkT ) on both Bayesian and frequentist re-
gret. Perhaps surprisingly, these bounds apply to clear and simple applications of K-learning [28]
and Upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithms [3] and without restriction on the opponent’s strat-
egy. Additionally we show that the stochastically optimistic algorithm Thompson sampling cannot
generally enjoy sublinear regret in the presence of an informed opponent [36]. This result clarifies
an important distinction between the applications of the OFU-principle that separates multi-player
games from the single-player setting. Although we present bounds for the bandit feedback case, it
is straightforward to generalize the results to the case where the agent receives full information, or
information about all the entries in the column and/or row selected.
We supplement our analytical results with a series of didactic experiments designed to unpick the
empirical scaling of these algorithms, and highlight the regimes where one approach may outper-
form the other. In short, we find that for random matrix games, optimistic approaches that leverage
knowledge of the matrix structure perform better than the adversarial Exp3 algorithm. This com-
putational work is far from definitive, but may help to guide future work in this nascent area of
research.
2 Applications
Uncertain games. Any two-player zero-sum game where the agent has uncertainty over the out-
comes of the actions and receives partial feedback is amenable to our framework. Such examples
exists in economics, sociology, politics, psychology and others [24]. Stochastic multi-armed bandits
are regularly used in advertising, but if fraudulent clicks from bots are present then this is better
modeled as a game between the agent and the fraudsters. Another example is intrusion detection
wherein an attacker attempts to penetrate a system while a defender attempts to prevent the attack,
and initially the players do not know the probability of detection for each pair of actions. Simi-
larly two political parties competing in a series of election can be modeled in this fashion, where
the actions correspond to targeting messages at different groups of voters and the parties start with
uncertainty about how each action will help or hurt their chances of winning an election.
2
Robust bandits. In the robust multi-armed bandit problem the reward of each arm is determined
partially by some other outcome which is selected by ‘nature’ [13, 19]. The outcomes selected
by nature are not necessarily independent across time-periods nor can we assume that the process
selecting the actions is stationary. It is because of these issues that standard stochastic multi-armed
bandit algorithms fail on this problem. To combat this, the agent may desire a policy that is robust,
in the minimax sense, to all possible selections by nature, which is naturally formulated as a game.
Examples of this problem include clinical trials where one or more characteristics of the patients are
not observed until after the treatment has been administered. Another is resource placement, where
an agent must place a resource, e.g., a server, in a location and respond to requests as they come
in. The agent wants to minimize the worst-case response latency, but does not know in advance
the average latency between all pairs of nodes. A further example is route planning, wherein an
agent must decide which route to take to reach some goal but does not know in advance the average
times required to traverse each leg and some exogenous variable influences the travel times, such as
road conditions or traffic. Similar problems exist in A/B testing, advertising, recommender systems,
scheduling, and queueing.
Bandits with budget constraints. Consider a multi-armed bandit problem where additionally
when an arm is pulled it consumes some amount ci of each of i = 1, . . . ,m available resources.
Each resource has a total amount available and the total amount consumed before T time-periods
must be less than this total [6]. This situation is very common in practice and arises, for example, in
clinical trials when the inputs to each of the treatments is not identical and each input has a limited
amount available, or in online advertising where the campaigns have total spend limits. It turns out
this problem can be embedded into a repeated zero-sum two-player matrix game [17, §4]. In this
case the average reward of each action and the average amount of resource consumed by each action
may be initially unknown.
3 Optimistic exploration in repeated games
In the literature on efficient exploration, the principle of ‘optimism in the face of uncertainty’ (OFU)
has driven the majority of studied algorithms. This approach assigns a bonus to poorly-understood
actions to account for the value of exploration. The remainder of this section outlines several ap-
proaches to exploration driven by OFU, and examines the conditions in which each might be ef-
fective. For the most part, our results mirror those of the bandit literature but, in some cases, the
challenges of an opponent raise interesting challenges.
3.1 Upper confidence bound
Upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithms construct high-probability upper bounds on the value of
each possible action, then (generally) act greedily with respect to those bounds [21, 3]. Carefully
controlling how the bounds change over time yield algorithms that achieve low regret [11, 23]. This
is a form of deterministic optimism, and it will turn out that in matrix games this determinism is
crucial to prevent exploitation by the opponent. Before we develop the algorithm, we require the
following assumption 1.
Assumption 1. The noise process ηt, t ∈ N is 1-sub-Gaussian and the payoff matrix satisfies
A ∈ [0, 1]m×k.
Under this assumption we can use the Chernoff inequality to provide an upper bound on each Aij
for all t that holds with probability at least 1− δ:
Aij ≤ A¯tij +
√
2 log(T/δ)/(1 ∨ ntij), (8)
where A¯tij is the empirical mean of the samples from Aij , n
t
ij is the number of times that row
i and column j has been chosen by the players up to (but not including) round t, and we have
used the notation (1 ∨ ·) = max(1, ·). Since we do not control the opponent we cannot try every
possible action once, so we define the empirical mean A¯ij to be zero whenever ntij = 0 and we shall
choose δ such that
√
2 log(1/δ) ≥ 1, which provides an upper bound on Aij whenever ntij = 0 by
assumption that A ∈ [0, 1]m×k. This motivates the UCB algorithm presented in algorithm 1. The
following theorem yields a worst-case regret bound; we defer the proof to the appendix.
3
Algorithm 1 UCB for matrix games
for round t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
compute A˜tij = A¯
t
ij +
√
2 log(2T 2mk)/(1 ∨ ntij)
use policy x ∈ argmaxx∈∆k miny∈∆m yT A˜tx.
end for
Algorithm 2 Thompson sampling for matrix games
for round t = 1, 2, . . . , do
sample A˜t ∼ φ | Ft
use policy x ∈ argmaxx∈∆k miny∈∆m yT A˜tx,
end for
Theorem 1. Let assumption 1 hold with T ≥ mk ≥ 2 and δ = 1/(2T 2mk). Then, the regret of
Algorithm 1 is bounded
WorstCaseRegret(A,UCB, T ) ≤ 1 + 2
√
mkT log (2mkT 2) = O˜(
√
mkT ).
3.2 Thompson sampling
Thompson sampling (TS) is a well-known Bayesian exploration strategy that randomly selects an
action according to the probability that it is optimal [39, 36, 31]. The performance of UCB algo-
rithms depend strongly on the confidence sets used to select the action. By contrast it can be shown
in single-player settings that any sequence of confidence sets can be used to bound the Bayesian re-
gret of Thompson sampling [34]. In this way TS benefits from the best choice of confidence bounds,
without explicitly having to know the best sequence of bounds in advance. With this in mind, one
might expect a Bayesian regret bound for TS of a similar order to the bound we just derived for
UCB. In this section we show that, in contrast to UCB, we can construct games and opponents that
force Thompson sampling to suffer linear regret. For the column player the Thompson sampling
algorithm is described in algorithm 2. Now take the following 2× 2 game[
r 0
0 −1
]
, r =
{
1 w.p. 1/2
−1 w.p. 1/2. (9)
Consider the case where the true value of r = 1, and the TS agent is competing against an agent
that knows the value of r and is simply playing the Nash equilibrium of (0, 1). The TS agent using
algorithm 2 will play (1, 0) with probability 1/2 and (1/2, 1/2) with probability 1/2. However,
since the other agent is playing the Nash, the uncertainty about the value of r will never be resolved,
and so the TS agent will have the same behaviour forever. Every time it selects the second column
it incurs a regret of 1, which happens with probability 1/4 every time period, thereby yielding linear
regret. This counter-example shows that Thompson sampling cannot enjoy sub-linear regret against
all opponents, however it does not rule out such bounds in more benign cases, such as self-play with
identical information.
The crucial distinction between Thompson sampling and UCB is the use of stochastic, rather than
deterministic, optimism. This stochasticity means that sometimes the TS agent is actually pes-
simistic about the true state of the world, and in those rounds the agent can be exploited by an
informed opponent. In the single-player case it can be shown that Thompson sampling can only
suffer high regret in any given round if it is also gaining information about the optimal action [35].
However, in the case with an opponent it is clear that Thompson sampling can suffer high regret
without gaining new information. It is in these cases that TS suffers linear regret, which we shall
confirm empirically in the numerical experiments.
3.3 Optimistic posterior estimates via K-learning
K-learning is a Bayesian exploration algorithm originally developed for Markov Decisions processes
in which the agent computes the value of states and actions using a risk-seeking utility function [28].
Since the resulting ‘K-values’ (Knowledge values) are optimistic for the expected values under the
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Algorithm 3 K-learning for matrix games
for round t = 1, 2, . . . , do
find (y?t , τ
?
t ) ∈ argminy∈∆m,τ≥0
(
τ log
∑k
j=1 expK
t
aj (y/τ)
)
use policy x?t ∝ expKtaj (y?t /τ?t )
end for
posterior, K-learning can be viewed as employing the OFU principle. However, it also can be inter-
preted as a variational approximation to Thompson sampling [30] which incorporates deterministic
optimism while maintaining many of the benefits of Thompson sampling over UCB style approaches
[32, 18]. Like UCB, the deterministic optimism is central in the development of a regret bound. First,
let aj denote the jth column of A, which is a random variable with conditional cumulant generating
function Ktaj : R
m → R, defined as
Ktaj (y) = logE
t exp(a>j y), (10)
and note that this is the cumulant generating function of aj under the posterior, conditioned on all
the history of observations so far in Ft. With this in place we present K-learning as algorithm 3.
The optimization problem in algorithm 3 is convex and can be expressed as an exponential cone
program, for which efficient algorithms exist [27, 38, 15]. We have the following Bayesian regret
bound for K-learning; the proof is included in the appendix.
Theorem 2. Under assumption 1 the K-learning algorithm 3 satisfies the following Bayesian regret
bound
BayesRegret(φ,Klearn, T ) ≤ 2
√
mkT log k(1 + log T ) = O˜(
√
mkT ).
Now we return to the simple 2×2 problem with payoff matrix in equation (9). Recall that Thompson
sampling will incur linear regret in this setting since it will select the second column with probability
1/4 each round. By contrast, a quick calculation tells us that K-learning in this situation will always
play the strategy (1, 0), thereby incurring zero regret, and will play this forever even though the
uncertainty about the value of r is never resolved. This is demonstrated in Figure 1.
4 Adversarial bandit algorithms
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Figure 1: Regret for game matrix (9)
In the adversarial bandit framework, an adversary and
learner interact sequentially over T rounds. In each round
t, the learner chooses a distribution xt ∈ ∆k and the ad-
versary simultaneously chooses a loss vector `t ∈ [0, 1]k.
Any algorithm designed for adversarial bandits can be
used in our setting by choosing `ti = −Ajti. The usual
definition of the regret in this notation is
E
[
max
i
T∑
t=1
Ajti −
T∑
t=1
rt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adversarial regret
≥ R(A, alg, T ) .
Hence, an algorithm with small adversarial regret auto-
matically enjoys small regret relative to the Nash strat-
egy [16]. There are now many algorithms for adversarial
bandits, the most well-known being Exp3 [4]. The basic
algorithm uses importance-weighting to estimate the re-
wards for each action and samples from a carefully tuned exponential weights distribution. Let rˆti
be the importance-weighted estimate of the reward of action i in round t:
rˆti =
rt1(it = i)
xti
,
5
where the distribution of the player xt is given by
xti =
γt
k
+ (1− γt)
exp
(
ρt
∑t−1
s=1 rˆsi
)
∑k
j=1 exp
(
ρt
∑t−1
s=1 rˆsj
) .
When ρt and γt are tuned appropriately, then the regret of Exp3 relative to the best action in hindsight
is
E
[
max
i
T∑
t=1
Ajti −
T∑
t=1
rt
]
= O
(√
kT log k
)
. (11)
The reader will notice that this bound is independent of the number of actions of the opponent,
which was not true for UCB or K-learning. Another strength of Exp3 and similar algorithms is that
the alternative notion of regret means they can exploit weak opponents. On the other hand, Exp3 is
empirically much worse than K-learning and UCB. The reason is that Exp3 does not use the structure
of the game and cannot quickly eliminate actions that do not play a strong role in any plausible Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, in many cases the goal is to learn the Nash equilibrium (if possible),
i.e., to have ‘solved’ the game, not just to exploit the opponent. For example, since Exp3 does not
converge to the minimax solution in general, it does not solve the robust bandit problem. Concretely,
consider playing rock-paper-scissors against an opponent with fixed strategy (0.2, 0.2, 0.6). Exp3
against this opponent will learn to play (1, 0, 0). However, a UCB or K-learning agent will learn to
play the Nash strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and will not be exploitable by any opponent (i.e., they will be
robust), even though they only played against a weak player. If suddenly the opponent changes then
Exp3 will suffer significantly larger losses than the robust algorithms even though the final regret
may not be worse. We shall demonstrate this phenomenon in the numerical experiments.
There are many adaptations of Exp3. The main threads are (a) using the online convex optimisation
view and modifying the regularizer [2, 10, 42], for example, and (b) modifying the loss estimates to
obtain high probability regret or adaptive bounds [5, 20, 26, 1]. None of these algorithms are able
to handle the additional knowledge of the opponent’s action and we do not believe any will improve
on Exp3 by a significant margin empirically. The partial monitoring framework can incorporate
knowledge of the opponent’s action [37]. Partial monitoring is now reasonably well understood the-
oretically [7] and sensible algorithms exist [22]. Regrettably, however, even with Bernoulli rewards,
the matrix games studied here can only be modelled by exponentially large partial monitoring games
for which existing algorithms are not practical. The case of two-player matrix games where the ma-
trixA is selected adversarially at each timestep was considered in [12]. However, that work assumed
control of both players, so is not applicable here.
5 Numerical experiments
In this section we present numerical results comparing the performance of the algorithms we have
discussed so far. In most cases we are interested in measuring the empirical regret on a particular
problem. Since this depends on the opponent we shall report cumulative absolute regret, i.e.,
T∑
t=1
|V ?A − yTt Axt|,
for fixed A, and we shall average this over 10 seeds for each approach. This is meaningful because
we only consider two cases: self-play and against a best-response opponent. In self-play the algo-
rithm is competing against another player using the same algorithm and so the cumulative absolute
regret is a measure of how far the players are from the Nash equilibrium. The best-response oppo-
nent knows the exact value of A and the agent’s strategy at every round, and so can compute the
action that minimizes the expected payoff. In this case the regret the agent suffers is always positive,
so the absolute regret is the same as the usual notion of regret.
When running Exp3 we used the following parameters
γt = min(
√
k log k/t, 1), ρt =
√
2 log k/tk.
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5.1 Rock-paper-scissors
In the classic children’s game rock-paper-scissors, the payoff matrix is given by
R P S
R 0 1 -1
P -1 0 1
S 1 -1 0,
which defines a symmetric game with Nash equilibrium (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for both players. When
comparing the techniques on this problem we add noise ηt ∼ N (0, 1) to the payoff, and use prior
N (0, 1) for each entry in the matrix for the Bayesian algorithms. In Figure 2a we present the self-
play results. K-learning and UCB perform the best. Although Thompson sampling doesn’t enjoy a
regret bound against all opponents, it still appears to perform well in self-play. Exp3, which does
not use the matrix structure of the problem, takes a very long time to learn the optimal strategy.
We show the KL-divergence between the policy and the Nash equilibrium in each time period in
Figure 2b. The algorithms that leverage knowledge of the matrix structure are converging to the
Nash equilibrium far more rapidly than Exp3. In Figure 2c we show the regret against a best-
response opponent. The major difference in this case is the dramatic decline in performance for
Thompson sampling. It is clear that even in this simple case TS is easily exploited by an informed
opponent. The other three algorithms do not appear to be significantly impacted.
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(a) Self-play regret.
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(c) Vs. best-response regret.
Figure 2: Results for rock-paper-scissors
5.2 Random game
We also compare the algorithms we presented on a random matrix game. We set m = n = 10 and
generated the entries of the matrix A randomly IID from U [0, 1]. The Bayesian algorithms were
given N (0.5, 1) as the prior. The noise at every round was sampled ηt ∼ N (0, 0.4). The self-
play results are presented in Figure 3a. Again K-learning performs the best, Exp3 and Thompson
sampling perform reasonably, but UCB appears to perform relatively poorly. In Figure 3b we show
the regret against the best-response opponent. Now unsurprisingly Thompson sampling is the worst
performer. UCB is relatively unaffected. The performance of K-learning degrades but it is still the
best performing approach.
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(a) Self-play regret for random game.
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(b) Vs. best-response regret for random
game.
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TS K-learn Exp3 UCB Naive UCB
Proportion rewards < 0 0.018 0.009 0.099 0.033 0.149
Average reward 0.811 0.900 1.074 0.969 1.222
Table 1: Performance on robust bandit problem.
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Figure 4: Histograms of rewards on robust bandit problem.
5.3 Robust bandit problem
In the robust bandit problem the reward the agent receives is partially determined by outcomes
selected by nature, and the agent wants a policy that is robust to all possible outcomes. This problem
can be formulated as a game to which we can apply the algorithms we have developed. To test
their performance we generated a random game with k = 10 agent actions and m = 5 possible
outcomes, where each entry of A was sampled IID from N (0.5, 2.0). Nature sampled actions from
a fixed policy that changed randomly every 50 time-steps. We compare the algorithms presented in
this manuscript against naive UCB which treated the problem as though it was a standard stochastic
multi-armed bandit problem. We ran each algorithm for 1000 time-steps from 50 random seeds and
we plot the histogram of the per time-period expected rewards in Figure 4 (the expectation is with
respect to the policies of the players at each time-period). In Table 1 we show what proportion of
the time each algorithm suffered a negative expected reward, as well as the average reward of each
approach. It is clear that the naive approach suffers from negative rewards more frequently, i.e., it
is not robust to the changing conditions of nature. For example, K-learning suffers negative rewards
almost 16× less frequently than the naive approach, which suffered negative rewards almost 15%
of the time, at the expense of slightly lower average reward. We can also see that Exp3 is not robust
since it too suffers significantly more negative expected rewards than K-learning and UCB. Since
Exp3 attempts to exploit the nature player, it can suffer large negative rewards for several periods
when nature switches distribution.
6 Conclusion
The usual analysis of matrix games assumes that both players have perfect knowledge of the payoffs.
We extended this to the case where the matrix that specifies the game is initially unknown to the
players and must be learned about from experience, specifically from noisy bandit feedback. We
showed that two previously published algorithms, UCB and K-learning, can be extended to this
case and enjoy a sublinear regret bound, even against informed opponents that can compute a best-
response to their strategies. We also showed a counter-example that rules out a sublinear regret
bound for Thompson sampling under the same conditions. This difference between deterministically
optimistic and stochastically optimistic algorithms is a significant departure from the single-player
case. We supported our findings with extensive numerical experiments that showed a significant
advantage of these approaches when compared to both Thompson sampling and Exp3.
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Broader impact
This work deals with online learning in zero-sum two-player matrix games. These games, or prob-
lems that can be modeled using these games, arise in practice as discussed in §2. This work derives
new algorithms and proves regret bounds for this case, which expands the set of problems for which
we have efficient solutions. However, there are some potential areas of abuse. Game theory has
historically had applications in war, which can be modeled as a two-player zero-sum game. This
work could potentially aid strategists in war make decisions about which actions to take. That being
said, the algorithms we develop have far more positive than negative applications. For example, in
clinical trials more efficient and robust approaches to treatment selection can save lives, and in this
work we developed an approach that can provide robustness even when conditions influencing the
outcomes changes unpredictably.
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A Appendix
Theorem 1. Let assumption 1 hold with T ≥ mk ≥ 2 and δ = 1/(2T 2mk). Then, the regret of
Algorithm 1 is bounded
WorstCaseRegret(A,UCB, T ) ≤ 1 + 2
√
mkT log (2mkT 2) = O˜(
√
mkT ).
Proof. LetEt be the event that there exists a pair i, j such that (A˜t)ij < Aij . By definition,Et ∈ Ft.
Consider for a moment that Et does not hold and let
y˜t = argmin
y∈∆m
y>A˜txt
be the best response to the player’s in round t. Since Et does not hold, the upper confidence matrix
over-estimates the true matrix and hence V ?
A˜t
≥ V ?. Then the per-round regret satisfies
V ?A −Et[y>t Axt] ≤ Et
[
V ?
A˜t
− y>t Axt
]
= Et
[
y˜>t A˜txt − y>t Axt
]
≤ Et
[
y>t (A˜t −A)xt
]
= Et
√
2
1 ∨ ntitjt
log
(
1
δ
)
,
where the first inequality follows from optimism and the second since y˜t is the best response to xt
for matrix A˜t. Next, by the definition of the regret,
R(T ) = E
[
T∑
t=1
V ?A −Et
[
y>t Axt
]]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
√
2
1 ∨ ntitjt
log
(
1
δ
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+T P
(∪Tt=1Et)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
.
The second term is bounded naively by (B) ≤ 2T 2mkδ ≤ 1. The first term is bounded by
(A) ≤
∑
i,j
E
T∑
t=1:it=i,jt=j
√
2
1 ∨ ntij
log
(
1
δ
)
≤
∑
i,j
E
√
4nTij log
(
1
δ
)
≤
√
4mkT log
(
1
δ
)
,
where the final inequality follows from Cauchy–Schwarz.
Theorem 2. Under assumption 1 the K-learning algorithm 3 satisfies the following Bayesian regret
bound
BayesRegret(φ,Klearn, T ) ≤ 2
√
mkT log k(1 + log T ) = O˜(
√
mkT ).
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Proof. Using the tower property of expectation we can bound the Bayes regret as
BayesRegret(φ,Klearn, T ) = E
T∑
t=1
Et(V ?A − rt)
= E
T∑
t=1
Et( min
y∈∆m
max
x∈∆k
yTAx)−Et(rt)
≤ E
T∑
t=1
min
y∈∆m
Et max
x∈∆k
yTAx− yTt (EtA)xt
(12)
via Jensen’s inequality, and the fact that the policies xt and yt adapted to the filtration (σ(Ft), t ∈
N). Now we shall develop an upper bound for the expected value of the max.
Then for any τ > 0,
Et max
x∈∆k
yTAx = Et max
j
a>j y
≤ τ logEt exp max
j
a>j y/τ
= τ logEt max
j
exp a>j y/τ
≤ τ log
k∑
j=1
expKtaj (y/τ),
where we used Jensen’s inequality and the fact that the sum of positive numbers is greater than the
max, and Ktaj is the cumulant generating function (10). We denote by Lt : Rk × Rm × R+ → R,
t = 1, . . . , T , the Lagrangian
Lt(x, y, τ) =
k∑
j=1
xjτK
t
aj (y/τ) + τH(x), (13)
where H(x) = −∑kj=1 xj log(xj) is the entropy of the agent policy, and it is straightforward to
show that
τ log
k∑
j=1
expKtaj (y/τ) = maxx∈∆k
Lt(x, y, τ).
and the x that achieves the maximum is given by
x? ∝ expKtaj (y/τ).
We can bound the first term in the last line of (12) using
min
y∈∆m
Et max
x∈∆k
yTAx ≤ min
y∈∆m,τ≥0
max
x∈∆k
Lt(x, y, τ)
= Lt(x?t , y?t , τ?t ).
For fixed x ∈ Rk the Lagrangian is jointly convex in y ∈ Rm and τ > 0, since cumulant generating
functions are always convex and τKtaj (y/τ) is the perspective of K
t
aj , which preserves convex-
ity. On the other hand, for fixed y and τ ≥ 0 the Lagrangian is concave in x, since entropy is
concave [29]. Therefore the Lagrangian is convex-concave jointly in (y, τ), x, which implies that
Lt(x?t , y?t , τ?t ) ≤ Lt(x?t , y, τ) for any feasible y ∈ ∆m, τ ≥ 0, due to the saddle point property.
From this we can bound the Bayes regret incurred in round t from (12)
Et(V ?A − rt) ≤ Lt(x?t , y?t , τ?t )− yTt Et(A)xt
≤ Lt(x?t , yt, τt)− yTt Et(A)xt,
(14)
where yt is the strategy played by the opponent, and τt ≥ 0 is a free parameter. Assumption 1
implies that the posterior of aj , j = 1, . . . , k, is 1-sub-Gaussian and concentrates at least as fast as
a Gaussian, i.e.,
τKtaj (y/τ) ≤ (Etaj)T y +
m∑
i=1
y2i
2τ(ntij + 1)
. (15)
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Now all that remains is to bound the sum over time using equation (14) and equation (15)
BayesRegret(φ,Klearn, T ) ≤ E
T∑
t=1
∑
i,j
x?tjy
2
ti
2τt(ntij + 1)
+ τtH(x
?
t )

≤ E
T∑
t=1
∑
i,j
x?tjyti
2τt(ntij + 1)
+ τtH(x
?
t )

≤ mk(1 + log T )/2τT + log k
T∑
t=1
τt
≤ 2
√
mkT log k(1 + log T ).
where the third inequality follows from a pigeonhole argument which we present as lemma 1 below,
and the last inequality sets free parameter τt =
√
mk(1 + log T )/(4t log k).
Lemma 1. Consider a process that at each time t selects a single index at from {1, . . . , q} with
probability ptat . Let n
t
i denote the count of the number of times index i has been selected before time
t, and assume that T ≥ 1. Then
T∑
t=1
q∑
i=1
pti/(n
t
i + 1) ≤ q(1 + log T ).
Proof. This follows from a straightforward application of the pigeonhole principle,
T∑
t=1
q∑
i=1
pti/(n
t
i + 1) =
T∑
t=1
Eat∼pt(n
t
at + 1)
−1
= Ea0∼p0,...,aT∼pt
T∑
t=1
(ntat + 1)
−1
= Ea0∼p0,...,aT∼pt
q∑
i=1
nTi +1∑
t=1
1/t
≤
q∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
1/t
≤ q(1 + log T ),
since nti is the count before time t we have n
T
i + 1 ≤ T for each i and where the last inequality
follows since
∑T
t=1 1/t ≤ 1 +
∫ T
t=1
1/t = 1 + log T .
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